The second half of Switzerland’s chairpersonship of OSCE, the Organisation for Security and Cooperation in Europe, has begun. OSCE expert Walter Kemp, a Canadian based in Vienna, assesses the state of play. He does not exclude that the prospect of a military conflict between Russia and the West could prompt “a strange coalition of states” into a more active use of the organization, “including Russia and the United States”.
Is OSCE taking a break in the summer?
The OSCE generally has a bit of a break from meetings in the summer, but it’s often the case that crises happen in August. So, if you’re the chair of the organization, like Switzerland is this year, you always need to be paying attention even during the summer. For example, the crisis in Ukraine never sleeps.
Where does the organization stand at halftime of the Swiss chairmanship?
As we saw during the World Cup this summer, very often the score at halftime is not the same result as at the end of the match. So, I think we need to wait until late December to assess the Swiss chairmanship. Still, we can evaluate Switzerland’s success at halftime on the basis of the five priorities that it set for itself.
Let’s take them one by one starting with the Helsinki principles
The Swiss chairpersonship has always been stressing the importance of adhering to the Helsinki principles. It is helped in a way that we’re just coming off the 50th anniversary of the Helsinki Final Act last year. Switzerland is trying to put life back into those principles – trying to ensure that they’re not just historic principles, but guiding principles that participating states continue to adhere to. Recent developments show us what happens when states don’t live up to those principles – that is why we have this terrible situation within the OSCE area.
What about the second priority which is inclusive multilateral diplomacy?
This is the bread and butter of Swiss diplomacy. Switzerland has consultations with all participating states, including Russia, on a weekly basis. This is a big job for the team, particularly in Vienna. Switzerland, as chair, tries to be as even-handed as possible, but obviously it’s trying to balance this priority with the first one, namely to live up to the Helsinki principle. The chairman in office, Federal Councillor Cassis, …
has visited a number of participating states, including Ukraine and Russia, as well as Kazakhstan, Moldova, a few countries in the Balkans. That’s part of the job, to be the spokesman of the OSCE. He has underlined, as recently as the Annual Security Review Conference, the OSCE’s role as a forum to de-escalate tensions and discuss the future of European security. This is quite brave, because some participating states don’t think the time is ripe to talk about the future of European security. Foreign Minister Cassis says the OSCE is the logical place to do it, which I certainly agree with.
The third priority is anticipating technologies for a safe and humane future.
This is something that’s close to the minister’s heart, but also where Switzerland has a lot of added value, particularly in international Geneva. There was a good conference in Geneva in May, hosted by the Swiss chair. I heard that participants really appreciated this relatively new impulse of looking at the impact of technology on security. I think there’s also more that can be done in terms of strategic anticipation, looking over the horizon at the impact of technology.
What about priority number four, democracy, rule of law and human rights?
This is a tough one because the organization is based on consensus, and many participating states are backsliding away from some of the basic OSCE principles and commitments. Still, the Swiss chair has kept the spotlight on the so-called “human dimension”. For example, some countries have invoked the Moscow mechanism that holds Russia accountable for human rights violations, for example, in the areas of Ukraine that it has annexed.
A fifth priority is the OSCE’s ability to act.
This is where the Swiss chair has had the most success, but also faces the biggest challenge. It managed to get a unified budget adopted for the first time in five years. That is vital to enable the OSCE to function as an organization. At the same time, the Swiss chair has been pushing the reform agenda and has a very strong ally in the United States, which actually made its agreement on the budget conditional on discussions of reform. The Chair has been working with OSCE executive structures like the Secretary, but also with the Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights, ODIHR, on contingency planning for a possible future role for the OSCE in Ukraine, such as ceasefire monitoring, election monitoring, and a package of measures that the OSCE could do if the conditions improve. The chair has been visiting certain field operations, which are one of the main assets of the organization, and underlining their continued usefulness. But the big challenge is finding a country to chair the organization in 2027. At this point, you would know who that is and they would have at least a year to prepare. That is not the case at the moment, so there is actually no Troika per se. Therefore, finding a country to chair the OSCE for next year will be a priority in the second half of the year. Switzerland needs somebody to pass the baton to.
Do you see any change in appreciation for the usefulness of the OSCE?
It is very difficult for a consensus-based organization, which is trying to broker cooperation, to operate as the conflict between Russia and Ukraine escalates. The stakes are getting higher now that Russia talks about war with the West. This shows why you need an organization like the OSCE to have diplomatic dialogue, to have military-to-military contacts.
What is the chair’s room for manoeuvre in the current geopolitical environment?
The situation is obviously very difficult because of the conflict between Russia and Ukraine and growing tensions between Russia and the West. The forum or the format for discussing a future security arrangement is the structured dialogue, chaired by Norway. It’s an informal body that meets quite regularly. Norway has been trying to say, look, even in a zero-trust environment, we need to use the OSCE toolbox to have guardrails that we somehow have restraint and manage relations along this 5,000 kilometer border between Russia and the West, reducing the risks of accidents and incidents, talking about confidence and security building measures, arms control, the impact of technology on existing commitments, this type of thing. I think slowly, slowly, many participating states understand the self-interest. Switzerland has certainly been pushing in that direction, but Switzerland is not the chair of the process. To get back to the footfall analogy, the chair has a strange role because it has to be a referee to make sure that countries follow the rules, it has to be a coach in the sense that it has to motivate the participating states and give them a game plan, and it should be a playmaker, because it needs to score the goals that it has set for itself. The combination of these roles, particularly on the current playing field, is a big ask of any country, although of all of the 57 participating States, Switzerland is probably best equipped and best positioned to manage the organization in such a difficult time. This is why it’s all the more concerning that there is no chair for 2027, because the country would have a very short period of time to prepare and 2027 is not going to be any easier than 2026.
Which countries are talked about as a possible chair for 2027?
Cyprus has been a candidate but doesn’t enjoy consensus. I think Georgia has expressed an interest. There has been talk about a neutral EU country, such as Austria or Ireland. I’ve recently heard Hungary as a possible idea. Obviously, it has to be a country that is interested, prepared, and would have the support of all 57 states;that’s not so easy.
Recently, the Parliamentary Assembly of the OSCE met in Den Haag, without Russian participation, and issued a declaration that’s strong on Helsinki and Paris principles. How much is this worth?
It’s great that members of parliament from different participating states are engaged, and that they feel strongly about these issues and underline the importance of defending OSCE principles. That’s absolutely vital. At the same time, as you say, Russia doesn’t participate in the Parliamentary Assembly. That’s a big difference compared to the Permanent Council where, at some point, you have to have diplomatic engagement with Russia. This is something that Switzerland has been trying to do.
With any success? Does Russia engage?
My understanding is that Russia, including its ambassador, is quite active. What’s also interesting is now, for the first time in at least a year, an American ambassador has been appointed. This should bring some more attention from Washington, and there are ways that the OSCE can be used to serve the American national interest. The United States, I think, is quite willing to engage in dialogue with Russia. The OSCE is a good place to talk about strategic stability, confidence- and security-building measures, and reform
What do people mean when they talk about reform?
For some, it means reform of the OSCE – making it more effective and efficient. For others, it is code for cutting or diminishing some aspects of the organization’s work. For a small minority, reform is more to do with using the OSCE to help transform the future of European security. This is less about reform than providing a sense of directionand leadership, which in this context is very difficult. Nevertheless, for a combination of reasons, and due to different motivations, you may see a strange coalition of countries, including Russia and the United States, that think the OSCE could be useful in ways that it was in the 1980s and 90s and might want to somehow work through the OSCE.
So, a meaningful deliverable for the Lugano ministerial would have to be in the realm of getting a hand on that wider conflict between Russia and the West? Is this realistic?
I go back to the football analogy. A lot of things happen in the last 10 to 15 minutes of the game or even in extra time. So, I think for the Swiss chair, this is going to go right down to the wire. A success would be that a significant number of foreign ministers turn up at Lugano and show a willingness to engage, to show that they think the OSCE is still important, that they want to use it as a forum for dialogue, that they’re willing to talk to their enemies and not just their friends. Let’s see: it’s possible that things could get a worse before they get better. The Lugano Ministerial would either be an urgent opportunity to establish guardrails to prevent the situation from getting worse, or an opportunity to map out a way of managing relations more predictably and peacefully in the foreseeable future.
Do you take the concerns about a military confrontation between Russia and Western Europe seriously?
Of course. There needs to be a greater sense of urgency about de-escalating the situation and having dialogue. Some of this will have to be bilateral between Russia and Ukraine, between Russia and the United States, but all of the countries in the OSCE area have a stake and an interest in making sure that things don’t get worse.
Where does NATO come in here?
Some of the things that could be implemented in the context of the OSCE would need to be discussed among NATO members, like confidence-building measures, restraint measures, signaling, force posture, things like that. Currently, there are no discussions within the NATO-Russia Council, so NATO countries could talk to Russia and Belarus in the context of the OSCE.
One last question. Is pushing for human rights in the current context more of a nuisance or is it an area where the OSCE could find common ground?
In the past, OSCE institutions and some key participating states have championed the human dimension and human rights That group of states is shrinking as is the space for civil society. So it is important to keep a focus on the human dimension, as an end it itself and also in relation to the other dimensions of the OSCE’s work, namely the first dimension on political-military aspects of security, and the second dimension on economic and environmental issues. For a few years, there was a strong imbalance in favour of the human dimension, almost forgetting about the first dimension. Now we need a stronger focus on the first dimension without forgetting about the third dimension, because the OSCE has always stressed a comprehensive view of security. That said, the OSCE is not only about the participating states, it’s also civil society. In the 1970s and 80s, Helsinki committees were inspired by the Helsinki principles, holding their governments accountable for the implementation of those commitments. I think some of the commitments need to be updated, for example in the context of new realities such as the impact of technology on basic freedoms and human rights. Some countries do think it’s a nuisance, but that’s not a reason to stop doing it.
The German translation of this interview was published online at aussenpolitik.ch, the site of the Swiss foreign policy association.